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Abstract
Suspicions that the world might be some sort of a machine or algorithm existing
“in the mind” of some symbolic number cruncher have lingered from antiquity.
Although popular at times, the most radical forms of this idea never reached main-
stream. Modern developments in physics and computer science have lent support
to the thesis, but empirical evidence is needed before it can begin to replace our
contemporary world view.
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1 Historical notes
In a broad context, the development of rationalism, the enlightenment and
science can be perceived as an awakening from the illusory world of the senses
(Maya in Sanskrit); as a growing awareness that ”facts” which once were
perceived as self-evident turned out to be utterly wrong. Humanity once took
it for granted that it was located at the epicentre of the Universe. A closer
inspection revealed that there is no ground to claims of any preference in
location: Earth is conveniently situated in a solar system of a remote part of
our galaxy, which in turn is part of a group of galaxies and of the physical
Universe as we perceive it today. People also trusted that their bodies are
made-up of solid stuff. Later on they learned that, as their bodies consist of
atomic and subatomic “point” particles, things only appear to be solidly filled,
but in another perspective, space is “almost empty.” Time turned out to be
relative to the motion of observers, and single “particles” such as photons and
neutrons, seemed to be at two or more spatial positions at once. On another
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issue, people previously thought that they have been created in a different
way than other species. As it turned out, from a biological point of view,
mankind evolved and spread just like locusts and everyone else around. This
is corroborated not only by phylogenetic evidence, but by analysis of the very
DNA code that constitutes the genetic heritage and blueprint of our ancestors
and of all living beings. Indeed, the DNA itself turns out to be a biochemical
code running on cellular computers to the effect of creating, maintaining and
reproducing the organism of which it is a part.
Further disillusionments may lie ahead. Consciousness is still an “undiscover’d
country,” and maybe it is just a manifestation of neuronal brain functions. Or,
consciousness may be just the opposite: transcendental. Despite the achieve-
ments of Freud, certain dream phases are barely understood. Artists have
speculated that we are ”fleshware” units inside of a simulation-computation-
game that appears gigantic or even infinite to us. Who knows, we might have
even paid for to live a life in the twenty-first century in a beyond fair. That is
to say, we might be embedded in a literal “game” that we chose to pass the
time. To make things more realistic, all memories of the our life in the beyond
might have been erased from our immediate memories 1 . Maybe the “mean-
ing” of our world is rather trivial; like the simulation of marketing measures
for a beyond world 2 . As computers have begun to permeate our societies,
it is no wonder that the “universe as a computer” metaphor for the physi-
cal Universe has attracted increasing attention. Perhaps some day our own
technology could achieve such visions, and put it to our practical use 3 .
In antiquity, Pythagoras (6th cent. B.C.) “considered numbers as the essence
and principle of all things, and attributed to them a real and distinct exis-
tence; so that, in his view, they were the elements out of which the universe
was constructed” (from Bulfinch [5]). Plato’s (c. 427- c. 347 B.C.) emphasis
1 This is mind-body dualism in a new form. For a concrete mind-brain interface
model, see for instance Eccles’ proposal [1]. In this view, what appears to us as
the physical world is just a simulation-computation-game; and the mind(s) of the
player(s) is (are) transcendental with respect to the characters in this emulation.
Note the phrase “we are the dead on vacation” in Godard’s film Breathless.
2 This is the theme in Galouye’s 1964 novel Simulacron 3; the novel stimulated
Fassbinder’s Welt am Draht, as well the recent movie Thirteenth Floor. Somewhat
related scripts are those of Total Recall and Matrix. In Contact, Sagan mentions
the ”Zoo hypothesis” claiming that there is somebody (in this case aliens) watch-
ing us for ethnographic or other reasons. Philosophical speculations include Rene
Descartes’ world-as-a-lucid-dream vision [2, Meditation 1,9], and Putnam’s brain-
in-a-vat metaphor [3]; see also http://whatisthematrix.warnerbros.com.
3 There is a possibly apocryphal story [4, p. 127] that, when asked by his Prime
Minister Peel or by the Chancellor of the Exchequer Gladstone about the usefulness
of his findings, Faraday responded, “Why, sir, there is the probability that you will
soon be able to tax it.”
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in geometry, in particular his dictum “God geometrizes” 4 was interpreted by
Gauss (1777-1855) as “o theos arithmetizei,” or “God computes.” The vision
of a clockwork universe is probably best characterized by the (probably apoc-
ryphal) story, that when Laplace was asked by Napoleon how God fitted into
his secular system of Me´canique Ce´leste, he replied [6, p. 538], “I have no need
for that hypothesis” 5 .
In his famous lecture delivered before the International Congress of Math-
ematicians at Paris in 1900, Hilbert (1862-1943) enumerated twenty-three
problems, among them the compatibility of the arithmetical axioms (# 2),
the mathematical treatment of the axioms of physics (# 6), and the determi-
nation of the solvability of a diophantine equation (# 10) 6 . Go¨del (1906-78),
as well as Turing (1912-54) contributed towards the (negative) solution of #
2 & # 10. They pursued a formalization of mathematics by coding of ax-
iomatic systems, either by the uniqueness of prime factorization or by their
representation as (universal) computer programs 7 .
For the first time in human history, we are able to articulate precisely what
we mean when discussing computations. Turing’s universal computer model
is modelled after the syntax of everyday pencil and paper operations which
children learn at school. The paper lines are unwound into a tape, and what-
ever rules there are for computing can be represented by the combination of
tape, finite memory and simple read-write operations of the Turing machine.
The notion of universal computation is robust in the sense that any universal
computer can emulate any other universal computer (regardless of efficiency
and overhead), so that it does not really matter which one is actually imple-
mented. In a sense, the entire class of universal computer counts as a single
4 In Convivialium disputationum, liber 8,2, Plutarch stated, “Plato said God ge-
ometrizes continually.”
5 In his memoires written on St. He´le`ne, Napoleon states that he removed Laplace
from office as Minister of the Interior [6, p. 536] after only six weeks “because he
brought the spirit of the infinitely small into the government.”
6 http://babbage.clarku.edu/˜ djoyce/hilbert/problems.html
7 In a postscript dated from June 3rd, 1964 [7, p. 369-370], Go¨del’s opinion is clearly
expressed, “. . . due to A. M. Turing’s work [[on the universal Turing machine]],
a precise and unquestionably adequate definition of the general concept of formal
system can now be given, the existence of undecidable arithmetical propositions and
the non-demonstrability of the consistency of a system in the same system can now
be proved rigorously for every consistent formal system containing a certain amount
of finitary number theory. . . . Turing’s work gives an analysis of the concept of
“mechanical procedure” (alias “algorithm” or “computation procedure” or “finite
combinatorial procedure”). This concept is shown to be equivalent with that of a
“Turing machine.” A formal system can simply be defined to be any mechanical
procedure for producing formulas, called provable formulas.”
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computer, because they are all equivalent with respect to algorithmic emula-
tion of one another.
Robustness is a very important concept for the matter of computational uni-
verses, because it is not really important on which particular models or hard-
ware these universes are implemented; they are all in the same equivalence
class. Apart from the translation from one coding scheme to another, each one
of them is equivalent to the entire class. So, when it comes to their generic
properties, it is not really important whether automaton universes are mod-
elled to be Cellular Automata, Turing Machines, colliding billiard balls [8],
or biological substrates. All of this means that one is free to choose whatever
computational model suits best the particular purpose one has in mind.
Go¨del, Tarski, Turing and Chaitin, among others, revealed that, stated point-
edly, mathematical “truth” extends formal “provability.” Mathematics is in-
complete, and there always will be true theorems about a particular formal
system of axioms (sufficiently rich to contain arithmetic), such as consistency,
which are not provable “from within” that system 8 .
Wigner considered ”the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the nat-
ural sciences” [10], which is usually taken for granted but which, upon inspec-
tion, seems unfounded. One obvious solution to this bewilderment seems to
be the Pythagorean assumption that numbers are the elements out of which
the universe was constructed; and what appears to us as the laws of Nature
are just mathematical theorems or computations. Notice that, whereas Go¨del
once and for all settled the question of a complete finite description of math-
ematics to the negative, the question of whether or not a finite mathematical
treatment of the axioms of physics exists (Hilbert’s problem # 6) remains
open.
Another thread was opened by Edward Moore. Puzzled by the quantum me-
chanical feature of complementarity, Moore conceived a finite deterministic
model of complementarity capable of being run on a computer [11,12]. This
formalization of complementarity, not in terms of Hilbert space quantum me-
chanics, but by constructive algebraic, even finitistic, means, may be perceived
as the continuation of the Turing program to formalize the notion of “algo-
8 Go¨del’s own thoughts on the interpretation of his results are formulated very
nicely in a reply to a letter by A. W. Burks, reprinted in [9, p. 55], “I think the
theorem of mine which von Neumann refers to is . . . the fact that a complete epis-
temological description of a language A cannot be given in the same language A,
because the concept of truth of sentences of A cannot be defined in A. It is this
theorem which is the true reason for the existence of undecidable propositions in the
formal systems containing arithmetic. I did not, however, formulate it explicitly in
my paper of 1931 but only in my Princeton lectures of 1934. The same theorem was
proved by Tarski in his paper on the concept of truth . . .”
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rithm” or “computation” by conceptualizing it as a concrete machine model.
In another development, Von Neumann (preceded by Ulam [13]) constructed
a two-dimensional cellular array of finite deterministic automata which are
connected to their neighbors such that the state of each one of these automata
is determined by the previous states of itself and of its neigbors [9]. He was able
to show that such cellular automata (CA) could not only be in the robust class
of universal computers, but that entities inside such arrays could reproduce
themselves by holding their own descriptional code and the algorithmic means
to construct identical copies of themselves.
Stimulated by Von Neumann’s concept of CA, Konrad Zuse, the creator of
one of the first general purpose digital computers, suggested to look into the
idea that physical space itself might actually be such a “calculating space”
(“Rechnender Raum”) [14,15,16]. In this view, the physical objects exist as
computational entities immersed in such a computational medium. Zuse be-
came fascinated by the idea of going beyond quantum mechanics in discretizing
physics 9 , a vision he shared with the late Einstein 10 and many researchers,
among others Fredkin, Toffoli, Margolus, and Wolfram.
Fredkin and Toffoli investigated reversible CA, in which the global temporal
evolution can be inverted uniquely. That is, any CA configuration has a unique
predecessor and a unique successor. Note that, if the evolution is a bijective
map; i.e., is one-to-one for every single cell, then the global array is a reversible
CA as well. (The converse need not be satisfied.) For a concise account 11 the
reader is referred to the reviews by Toffoli & Margolus [19], Fredkin [20] and
Wolfram 12 . In a reversible world, nothing is lost or gained; and all revelations
9 Quantum theory just discretizes the number of quanta within a mode, yet the
modes themselves are still continuous.
10 In [17, p. 163], Einstein states, “There are good reasons to assume that nature can-
not be represented by a continuous field. From quantum theory it could be inferred
with certainty that a finite system with finite energy can be completely described by
a finite number of (quantum) numbers. This seems not in accordance with contin-
uum theory and has to render trials to describe reality with purely algebraic means.
However, nobody has any idea of how one can find the basis of such a theory.”
11 Reversibility of CA should not be confused with Bennett’s strategy to produce
“reversible” calculations from irreversible ones by temporarily copying their inter-
mediate results and permanently copying their final result, thereby setting the com-
puting agent to its initial state, as well as retaining the result of the computation
[18]. Any such operation must necessarily allow for copying; i.e., for a one-to-many
evolution, which is clearly not meant here.
12 Wolfram recently self-published a long-awaited and widely publicised book which,
among other issues, deals with some of the rules categorized for one-dimensional
automata [21] and their conceivable physical applications. It has been received am-
bivalently with reviews ranging from the author doing nice computer graphics to
becoming the biggest physics guru of all times [22]. Wolfram has attracted a lot of
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are permutated back and forth. In this sense, the very concept of question and
answer, of problem and solution, of past, present and future, and thus of a
directed “lapse of time,” remains relative, subjective and conventional [23].
2 Intrinsic randomness and undecidability
Contemporary theoretical physics postulates at least three types of random-
ness: (i) the “chaotic” randomness residing in the initial conditions, which are
assumed to be “drawn” (via the postulated axiom of choice) from a “contin-
uum urn.” Almost all elements of the continuum are nonrecursively enumer-
able and even random; i.e., algorithmically incompressible [24,25,26]; (ii) the
random occurrence of individual quantum events such as a detector click; (iii)
complementarity; i.e., the impossibility to measure two or more observables
with arbitrary precision at once.
2.1 Computational complementarity
As already mentioned, Moore [11] invented (parts of) finite automata theory to
formalize and model physical complementarity. Research in this area became
totally separated from its original physical perspective and developed into a
beautiful algebraic theory of its own [27]. Finkelstein [28] rediscovered Moore’s
paper and coined the term “computational complementarity.” Its concrete
logico-algebraic structure has been investigated by the author in a series of
papers with C. and E. Calude, Khoussainov, Lipponen, Schaller and others
[29,30,31,32], also in the context of reversible computation [33,34]. Automaton
logic turns out to be logically equivalent [35] to generalized urn models [36,37],
indicating that the associated logico-algebraic structure is more robust than
could be assumed from those single model types alone.
Arguably, the simplest automaton model featuring complementarity is a fi-
nite (Mealy) automaton in which the sets contain three internal states S =
{1, 2, 3}, three input symbols I = {1, 2, 3}, and two output symbols O =
{0, 1}. Let, for s ∈ S, i ∈ I, the (irreversible “guessing”) output function be
λ(s, i) = δsi. The (irreversible) transition function just steers the automaton
into a state corresponding to the input symbol; i.e., t(s, i) = i. The problem of
finding an unknown initial state by analysis of experimental input–output se-
quences yields a partitioning of the internal states {{1}, {2, 3}}, {{1, 3}, {2}},
and {{1, 2}, {3}}, according to the input 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Every one
attention for this subject; and it can only be hoped that the many claims made in
this opus will not deter others.
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of the partitions constitutes a Boolean algebra whose elements are comeasur-
able. The pasting of these three Boolean algebras along their common elements
(in this case just ∅ and {1, 2, 3}) yields a nonclassical, nondistributive logical
structureMO3, which is also realized by the algebra of propositions associated
with the electron spin state measurements along three different directions.
A systematic investigation shows that the logico-algebraic structures arising
from computational complementarity are very similar to those encountered in
quantum logics [32, Sec. 3.5.2]. In particular, any finite quantum (sub-)algebra
can be represented as an automaton logic and thus can be modelled with a
finite automaton. Clearly, infinite quantum structures, such as the continuous
“Chinese lantern” lattices MOc involved in electron spin state measurements
in continuous directions, or quantum contextuality, cannot be modelled with
a finite automaton.
Reversible finite automata have been introduced by the author [33,32,34] as
Mealy automata whose input and output symbols are identical. Consider the
Cartesian product S×I of the set of automaton states S with the set of input
symbols I, arranged in vector form SI = ((s1, i1), . . .); as well as the Cartesian
product S×O of the set of automaton states with the set of output symbols O,
again arranged in vector form SO = ((s1, o1), . . .). The transition and output
functions and thus the automaton computation can then be formalized by a
matrix multiplication SO = SI ·P , where P is the matrix associated with the
combined transition and output function P : SI → SO. Reversibility implies
that these matrices P are permutation matrices (i.e., every row and every
column contains exactly one entry “1,” all other entries are zeroes).
The most general probabilistic state of all reversible Mealy automata associ-
ated with a particular matrix “dimension” can be represented as the weighted
convex sum over all permutation matrices of this dimension. The result is a
doubly stochastic matrix (i.e., the sum of the real components of every row
and column adds up to one). Formally, let ψ : SI × SO → [0, 1] be the tran-
sition probability. The convex sum of all transition probabilities is one; i.e.,∑
SI,SO ψ(SI, SO) = 1.
A modification of this model, according to Fortnov [38,39], captures the class
BQP, the class of efficiently quantum computable problems. The modifica-
tion is twofold: first, the weighted sum over all permutation matrices contains
coefficients ψ, called “probability amplitudes,” which take on arbitrary ra-
tional values including negative values. Secondly, in order for the “quantum”
probabilities to be positive, the probability amplitudes ψ have to be squared.
These two modifications—negativity and square values—mark a demarcation
line between quantum and classical computation.
Although computational complementarity will not be reviewed any further
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here, it should be mentioned that Moore conceptualized input/output experi-
ments on finite automata, making a distinction between “intrinsic” cases where
only one automaton is available, and those in which an arbitrary number of
identical copies are accessible. In the latter case, there is no complementar-
ity, because after any experiment it is always possible to dispose of the used
automaton and get a fresh automaton copy for further experiment(s).
The intrinsic, embedded, case is the one experienced in physics, because the
observer cannot escape and always is part of the (“Cartesian prison” [2, Med-
itation 5,15]) system. Due to restrictions in copying and cloning, it is not
possible, for instance, to obtain an identical copy of a single photon or elec-
tron in a nonclassical state. And only in the single automaton case there is
a chance to experience complementarity, for only in this case it may happen
that, after answering to some query, the automaton undergoes an irreversible
transition, making it impossible for the experimenter to probe a different ob-
servable (and vice versa). Reversibility does not change the picture, since if
both the observer and the observed object were immersed in a reversible envi-
ronment, then the experiment could be “undone” and the original automaton
state reconstructed only at the price of loosing all the information gathered so
far [40]. This is an analogue to the quantum eraser experiment [41] and other
setups (e.g., [42]) developed for demonstrating the feasibility of a reconstruc-
tion of quantum states.
Bear in mind that complementarity is not only a feature of exotic finite models
which were specially crafted for this particular purpose. Since these finite
models represent a subset of objects that can be simulated by any universal
computer, such as a CA or a Turing machine, complementarity is, in a sense,
a generic and robust property of all computational universes.
2.2 Intrinsic undecidability
The quest to translate Go¨del-Turing type recursion theoretic undecidability
into physics has a long history. Go¨del himself did not believe that his results
have any relevance for physics, at least not for quantum physics 13 . Early on,
Popper speculated about limits of forecast in the light of these findings [44].
More recent undecidability results are based on physical configurations which
13 In [43, 140-141], Bernstein writes, Wheeler said, “I went to Go¨del, and I asked
him, ‘Prof. Go¨del, what connection do you see between your incompleteness theorem
and Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle?’ I believe that Wheeler exaggerated a little
bit now. He said, ‘And Go¨del got angry and threw me out of his office!’ Wheeler
blamed Einstein for this. He said that Einstein had brain-washed Go¨del against
quantum mechanics and against Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle! (The author
has asked professor Wheeler and got this anecdote confirmed.)
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are provably unsolvable through the reduction to the halting problem (e.g.,
[45,46,47]).
Indeed, since the Turing machine is modelled after a paper and pencil real
world scenario, universal computers can be embedded into certain physical
systems capable of universal computation. Undecidabilities can then be ob-
tained almost as a “free lunch;” i.e., by reduction to the recursive unsolvability
of certain prediction problems, such as the halting problem.
So, why do people such as Casti 14 , who had been very interested in the
subject, consider this issue as a “red herring?” Maybe because so far not
a single problem of relevance in physics not constructed for this particular
purpose is provably undecidable.
2.3 Continuum versus discrete physics
The conceptualization of the number system—from just a few finger counts
to the natural numbers, the integers, rationals, reals [50] and further on to
complex numbers, quaternions and hyperreals is undoubtedly one of the most
beautiful and greatest achievements of humanity. Nevertheless, as more and
more abstractions enter these great patterns of thought, one is compelled to
question their practical physical relevance. Clearly, for instance, infinite divisi-
bility (from the rational onwards) and continuity (from the reals onwards) find
strong pragmatic justifications by their applicability to almost all branches of
theoretical physics, including quantum mechanics. Even so, some doubts as to
the appropriateness of transfinite concepts in physical modelling remain [51].
Let us state the following correspondence principle between physical phenom-
ena and their models [52]: every feature of a computational model should be
reflected by the capacity of the corresponding physical system. Conversely, ev-
ery physical capacity, in particular of a physical theory, should correspond to
a feature of an appropriate computational model.
Nature does not seem to allow Zeno squeezing [53,54,55,56,57,58,59,29,33] and
other transfinite processes. It could therefore be conjectured that, as physical
systems do not possess adequate transfinite capacities, only finite computa-
tional models ought to be acceptable for theoretical modelling. This still ad-
mits universal computation and finite automata, but it wipes out classical,
nonconstructive continua.
Having said this, there may be some indication of absolute randomness in-
volved in certain quantum measurements, though. Suppose a single electron is
14 Casti (co-)organized two conferences; one in Santa Fe [48] and one in Abisko [49],
bringing together many who were interested in this issue at the time.
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prepared in a particular spin state in one direction θp. Assume further that its
spin state is not measured in this particular direction, but in another direction
θm. Then quantum mechanics predicts that the probability that identical spin
states are measured is cos2[(θp − θm)/2]; for a non-identical result the proba-
bility is 1− cos2[(θp−θm)/2] = sin
2[(θp−θm)/2] (classically, one would expect
linear dependencies on the measurement angles, such as 1− |θp − θm|/pi and
|θp−θm|/pi, respectively). Moreover, quantum mechanics postulates that these
outcomes are stochastic and cannot be reduced to some form of microscopic
law governing the single measurement outcomes. At θp − θm = pi/2, a series
of such experiments, when coded into a 0, 1-sequence, is postulated by the
quantum mechanical canon to render an algorithmically incompressible ran-
dom sequence [60]; a fact which can be used to construct a plug-in device [61];
just like another card which can be inserted into a computer and facilitates
the desired function, in this case the production of random data.
Here seems to be a physical source of absolute randomness [24,25,26] which
appears almost totally “free” of any computational costs. Just detune prepa-
ration and measurement to attain the goal of a perfect random number gen-
erator. Indeed, this quantum postulate of microphysical randomness seems to
be a remarkable fact, in particular since randomness is a valuable resource
which, in the context of universal computation, cannot be obtained “for noth-
ing.” Although “almost all” reals are random, it is hard (indeed impossible)
to come by any concrete element with that property. The closest one could
get may be Chaitin’s Ω number, which is the Kraft sum of the length of all
prefix-free halting programs on some universal computer (see [24,25,26] for
details). It is even possible to write down a finite program for computing the
first bits of Ω, but for better precision there is no computable radius of conver-
gence certifying that a particular finite sequence is the starting sequence for
Ω. In that respect Ω resembles Specker’s sequence of rational numbers with
non-recursive limit, or the Busy Beaver function [62,63,64].
So, is every electron a point particle capable of transfinite computations?
While electrons do not seem to possess any capacity of universal computation
at all, they appear just to be perfect random number generators. That is indeed
amazing! Maybe we just have not listened carefully enough when crafting the
computational models appropriate for physics. Is Turin’s universal computer
model, appended with an additional “random oracle” plug-in, sufficient?
In another scenario, an electron might just be coded to carry the answer to
a single question; e.g., related to its spin state in a particular direction. If re-
quested to answer a different question, such as about its spin state in a different
direction, it might just churn out random nonsense [65] according to Malus’
law [66,67]. Or, it may need an interface, an environment or measurement
apparatus translating the observer’s question to the language (or question)
understandable by the object [40,34], thereby introducing stochastic noise by
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uncontrollable macroscopic processes. So far, these are all metaphysical specu-
lations which need to be sorted out by operational means, i.e., by experiment.
2.4 Nonlocality & contextuality
Quantum nonlocality is a phenomenon which can be quite easily described,
yet remains mysterious. Consider again the spin state measurements of elec-
trons. Let us assume that it is possible to produce two particles in a singlet
state, such that, when their spin is measured along an arbitrary but identical
direction, their spin states are opposite. Now, consider the correlation of their
spin states when measured along arbitrary but different directions. As it turns
out, if the directions are different from 0 and from integer multiples of pi/2 or
pi, the quantum correlations are either weaker or stronger than the classical
correlations. This is related to the difference of the aforementioned quantum
probabilities versus the classical ones. In terms of elementary physical events,
one obtains more or fewer joint clicks in the detectors measuring the spin
states than would be conceivable classically for any such state. The doctrine
of “peaceful coexistence” between relativity theory and quantum mechanics
[68] assures that this feature cannot be used for faster than light quantum
signalling [69,70,71].
Can CA with local neighbourhood cell evolution reproduce quantum-type non-
locality? That seems to be a hard problem, in particular if one clings to the
idea of evolution functions which only depend on the neighbourhood, a prop-
erty which surely seems to be a constituent element in the definition of CA.
Indeed, with regards to nonlocality, little convincing evidence and comfort has
been given so far by the CA community. Zuse mentions the chess metaphor
of the bishop, a piece which can move in single-colour diagonal direction only,
thereby exerting a nonlocal influence on the entire chessboard [16]. But how
could the entire chessboard know of the bishop’s motion if information can
only propagate by one cell per time step? Considering quantized cells is no so-
lution, because the quantum nonlocalities introduced by proper normalization
of the entire ray wave function comes as no surprise [72]: quantum behaviour
of a quantized system is indeed to be expected.
Another, entirely different and radical possibility would be to give up the
notion of “calculating space” and consider a computational substratum which
is nonlocal from the very beginning. In this approach, the cellular space does
not correspond to anything which is spatially extended from a physical point
of view, such as the tesselated configuration space Zuse had in mind. Rather,
it might be some kind of generalized phase space, in which physical states are
discrete. This resembles the “old” quantum mechanics of Planck and Einstein
11
15 and known as Bohr-Sommerfeld “quantization.”
Contextuality is another controversial issue which is discussed in the quan-
tum context [74]. One may argue that as it cannot be operationalized anyway,
contextuality is a property of almost pure theoretical value, such as counter-
factuals or scholastic infuturabilities. In continuum theory, there are “exotic”
ways to come by [75,76], but this is no option for a discrete model. At first
sight, classical computers seem to be value definite and noncontextual, but a
closer inspection reveals that there are subtleties to be kept in mind. Value
definiteness need not imply that an agent is prepared to answer any exper-
imental question. Indeed, in contradistinction to Kant’s transcendental ideal
16 , and scholastic, theological speculations whether or not the omniscience of
God extends to events which would have occurred if something had happened
that did not happen, which have been so powerfully formalized into a finitistic
proof (cf. [78, p. 243] and [79, p. 179]), some properties may not be properly
definable for certain computational agents, and therefore may not be opera-
tional. For example, if an agent trained to wash dishes is confronted with the
task to write a book on hiking trails in New Zealand’s Waitakere ranges, it
will most certainly be at a complete loss. Or an agent advised to direct some
parties to a path on the right hand side when asked for right or left, will most
certainly be at a loss when asked whether to proceed up or down. The agent
simply would not be programmed and thus not be prepared to answer any
type of question, but rather only a small selection from among all conceivable
ones.
3 Intrinsic, embedded observer mode
Computational complementarity and undecidability in general are good ex-
amples of how the science of systems may enter physics. Unless one accepts
the concept of an “intrinsic embedded mode,” computational complementar-
ity disappears into thin air. And since system science seems foreign to most
15 As expressed by Planck [73, p. 387], “Again it is confirmed that the quantum
hypothesis is not based on energy elements but on action elements, according to the
fact that the volume of phase space has the dimension hf .”
16 In the 3. Hauptstu¨ck, 3. Abschnitt. Von dem transzendentalen Ideal (Prototypon
transscendentale), of “Kritik der reinen Vernunft,” [77], Kant states, “But again,
everything, as regards its possibility, is also subject to the principle of complete
determination, according to which one of all the possible contradictory predicates of
things must belong to it.” The German original reads, “Ein jedes Ding aber, seiner
Mo¨glichkeit nach, steht noch unter dem Grundsatze der durchga¨ngigen Bestimmung,
nach welchem ihm von allen mo¨glichen Pra¨dikaten der Dinge, sofern sie mit ihren
Gegenteilen verglichen werden, eines zukommen muß.”
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physicists, it is hard to see if and when such concepts will be more broadly
recognized.
As with all general concepts, it is hard to pinpoint when exactly the con-
cept of an intrinsic embedded observer was formulated for the first time 17 .
Boskovich [80] around 1755 referred to the fact that embedded observers can-
not recognize an overall change (squeeze, dilatation and contraction) of the
system size 18 . More recently, Toffoli [81] discussed the role of the observer
in uniform systems. Embedded observers are the big issue in relativity theory,
because Einstein insisted on operational methods available within the system
only in defining clocks, length scales, and when comparing them 19 . Ro¨ssler
[86,87] and the author [82,83,84,88,29], independently share similar concepts,
although Ro¨ssler’s emphasis has been on the role of the interface between ob-
server and observed object [89] rather than on concrete examples of automaton
logic or space-time frames 20 .
4 Space time frames of intrinsic observers
Relativity theory has altered the way we think of space and time from a
formal point of view, but the perception of space and time at large, and what
17 One is also tempted to mention Archimedes’ “points outside the world from which
one could move the earth.” Mind that Archimedes’ use of “points outside the world”
was in a mechanical rather than in a metatheoretical context: he claimed to be able
to move any given weight by any given force, however small.
18 In [80], Boskovich states, “. . . And we would have the same impressions if, un-
der conservation of distances, all directions would be rotated by the same angle, . . .
And even if the distances themselves would be decreased, whereby the angles and
the proportions would be conserved, . . .: even then we [[the observers]] would have
no changes in our impressions. . . . A movement, which is common to us [[the ob-
servers]] and to the Universe, cannot be observed by us; not even if everything would
be stretched or shrinked by an arbitrary amount.”
19 The author had some problem to publish a paper on embedded observers in
relativity theory, apparently because of the rather unconventional nature of the
subject. However, after an appeal, the paper became preprint # LBL-16097 [82]
and was later published in a revised version [83] (see also [84]). I write this to
encourage young researchers not to give up in pursuing their own nonfashionable
ideas [85].
20 When I was invited to participate to a Linz Ars Electronica conference on “Endo-
physics” in 1992, I was almost shocked by the similarity between Ro¨ssler’s thoughts
and the ones I had pursued. One follow-up meeting was organized by Atmanspacher
in Germany [90]. I later learned that for researchers trained in mathematical system
science, like John Casti, embedded observers sounded like a very familiar, almost
self-evident concept. [91,92,93].
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meaning is ascribed to these notions, has not changed too much: while pre-
relativistic “Galilean” type thinking considered space and time as absolute
and immutable, nowadays this role is ascribed to the relativistic forms of
space time coordinates and their transformation laws. It is almost as if the
attitude of the protagonists remained the same, but their message changed
slightly.
Relativity theory, as introduced by Einstein, at least in the first, kinematic,
part of the seminal 1905 paper [94], is conceived as a strictly operational theory
for embedded, intrinsic observers. Those observers are bound to use the meth-
ods and capabilities of the system of which they are an integral part; and they
cannot resort to an extrinsic, “God’s eye” overview of it. But operationalism is
not enough to create space-time frames. What is also needed (but seldom men-
tioned although implicitly assumed) are conventions for measuring time and
space, and for comparing those scales at different locations and different times
in co-moving and other experimental configurations. Indeed, the International
System of units outrightly declares a previously experimental physical fact to
be convention. The speed of light is assumed to be constant for all reference
frames. With the mild side assumption of the one-to-oneness (invertibility) of
space-time transformation, this convention declares the preservation of light
cones, and thus, by the preservation of set theoretic intersections of light cones
such as time- space- and lightlike onedimensional subspaces, results in affinity
and linearity of the transformation laws. From this point of view, the Lorentz
transformation is a geometric, not a physical entity. In geometry, this is known
as Alexandrov’s theorem [95,96,97,98,99,100,101].
So, in a sense, this is the big picture. If one requires invariance of some
“fundamental” speed and bijectivity of the transformation laws, then the
Lorentz-type transformation laws containing that “fundamental” speed follow.
Thereby, it makes no difference whether the associated observers are embed-
ded in the “real” Universe, in a CA, or in a plum pudding; as long as these
conditions and conventions are met, then Alexandrov’s theorem certifies that
the geometry is a relativistic one. For discrete models, these results will always
be only approximations which are valid down to scales where the discreteness
becomes important.
Where is all the physics gone? The answer to this question is that the physics
is in the invariance with respect to any such Lorentz-type transformations.
For example, clocks governed by electromagnetic phenomena will be showing
the “right” time in all frames if the “fundamental” speed is chosen to be
the speed of light. Sound clocks tick invariantly in the respective system if
the “fundamental” speed is the speed of sound. Scales are invariant if the
forces stabilizing that scales are electromagnetic ones and the “fundamental”
speed is again chosen to be the speed of light. So, with these new conventions,
the invariance of certain length [102] and time scales, corresponding to the
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relativistic form invariance of the laws governing them, becomes a physical
statement [103,102,104,105].
The following is an example [106] of an Einstein synchronisation by clocks
generating radar coordinates in a one-dimensional CA with the following evo-
lution rules.
ϕ(>, ,X) →>, ϕ(X, ,<) →<, ϕ( , , ) → , ϕ(X, ,>) → , ϕ(<, ,X) → ,
ϕ( , >, ) → , ϕ( , <, ) → , ϕ( , >, I) →<, ϕ(I,<, ) →>, ϕ(>, I,X) → ∗,
ϕ(<, ∗, X) → I, ϕ(X,<, ∗) → , ϕ(∗, 1, X) → 2, ϕ(∗, 2,X) → 3, ϕ(∗, 3, X) → 4,
ϕ(∗, 4,X) → 5, ϕ(∗, 5, X) → 6, ϕ(∗, 6, X) → 7, ϕ(∗, 7,X) → 8, ϕ(∗, 8, X) → 9,
ϕ(∗, 9,X) → 0, ϕ(∗, 0, X) → 1, ϕ(0, ,X) → , ϕ(1, ,X) → , ϕ(2, , X) → ,
ϕ(3, , X) → , ϕ(4, ,X) → , ϕ(5, ,X) → , ϕ(6, ,X) → , ϕ(7, , X) → ,
ϕ(8, , X) → , ϕ(9, ,X) → , ϕ(X, ∗, 0) → ∗, ϕ(X, ∗, 1) → ∗, ϕ(X, ∗, 2) → ∗,
ϕ(X, ∗, 3) → ∗, ϕ(X, ∗, 4) → ∗, ϕ(X, ∗, 5) → ∗, ϕ(X, ∗, 6) → ∗, ϕ(X, ∗, 7) → ∗,
ϕ(X, ∗, 8) → ∗, ϕ(X, ∗, 9) → ∗, ϕ(X, 1, X) → 1, ϕ(X, 2,X) → 2, ϕ(X, 3, X) → 3,
ϕ(X, 4,X) → 4, ϕ(X, 5, X) → 5, ϕ(X, 6, X) → 6, ϕ(X, 7,X) → 7, ϕ(X, 8, X) → 8,
ϕ(X, 9,X) → 9, ϕ(X, 0, X) → 0, ϕ(X, I, 0) → I, ϕ(X, I, 1) → I, ϕ(X, I, 2) → I,
ϕ(X, I, 3) → I, ϕ(X, I, 4) → I, ϕ(X, I, 5) → I, ϕ(X, I, 6) → I, ϕ(X, I, 7) → I,
ϕ(X, I, 8) → I, ϕ(X, I, 9) → I, ϕ(X, I, 0) → I, ϕ(X, I,X) → I, ϕ(∗, , X) → ,
ϕ( , , I) → , ϕ(I, , ) → , ϕ(I, >, ) → , ϕ( , <, I) → .
(1)
Here, X stands for any state except the ones already specified. These rules
look a little bit “murky,” but they can be simulated by any universal CA and
they serve their purpose to demonstrate clock synchronization procedures.
Assume two clocks at two arbitrary points A and B in the CA which are “of
similar kind.” At some arbitrary A-time tA a ray goes from A to B. At B
it is instantly (without delay) reflected at B-time tB and reaches A again at
A-time tA′ . The clocks in A and B are synchronized if tB − tA = tA′ − tB.
The two-ways ray velocity is given by 2|AB|/(tA′ − tA) = c, where |AB| is
the distance between A and B. In Fig. 1(a), an example of synchronization
between two clocks A and B is drawn.
What happens with the intrinsic synchronization and the space-time coordi-
nates when observers are considered which are in motion with respect to the
CA? For simplicity, suppose a constant motion of v automaton cells per time
cycle. With these units, the ray speed is c = 1, and v ≤ 1. There are nu-
merous ways to simulate sub-ray motion on a CA. In what follows, the case
v = 1/3 will be studied in such a way that every three CA time cycles the
walls, symbolised by I, move one cell to the right.
Notice that two clocks which are synchronized in a reference frame which is
at rest with respect to the CA medium are not synchronized in their own co-
moving reference frame. Consider, as an example, the CA drawn in Fig. 1(b).
(Strictly speaking, the CA rule here depends on a two-neighbor interaction.)
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clock1 A B clock2 clock1 A B clock2 clock1 A B clock2
______I>__I0__I>______I__I>__I0______ __I>_I0__I___<___I__I>_I0________________ __I>_I1__I___<___I__I>_I0________________
______I_>_I0__I_>_____I__I_>_I0______ __I_>I0__I__<____I__I_>I0________________ __I_>I1__I__<____I__I_>I0________________
______I__>I0__I__>____I__I__>I0______ __I_<*0__I_<_____I__I_<*0________________ __I_<*1__I_<_____I__I_<*0________________
______I__<*0__I___>___I__I__<*0______ ___I>_I1__I>______I__I>_I1_______________ ___I>_I2__I>______I__I>_I1_______________
______I_<_I1__I____>__I__I_<_I1______ ___I_>I1__I_>_____I__I_>I1_______________ ___I_>I2__I_>_____I__I_>I1_______________
______I<__I1__I_____>_I__I<__I1______ ___I_<*1__I__>____I__I_<*1_______________ ___I_<*2__I__>____I__I_<*1_______________
______I>__I1__I______>I__I>__I1______ ____I>_I2__I__>____I__I>_I2______________ ____I>_I3__I__>____I__I>_I2______________
______I_>_I1__I______<*__I_>_I1______ ____I_>I2__I___>___I__I_>I2______________ ____I_>I3__I___>___I__I_>I2______________
______I__>I1__I_____<_I__I__>I1______ ____I_<*2__I____>__I__I_<*2______________ ____I_<*3__I____>__I__I_<*2______________
______I__<*1__I____<__I__I__<*1______ _____I>_I3__I____>__I__I>_I3_____________ _____I>_I4__I____>__I__I>_I3_____________
______I_<_I2__I___<___I__I_<_I2______ _____I_>I3__I_____>_I__I_>I3_____________ _____I_>I4__I_____>_I__I_>I3_____________
______I<__I2__I__<____I__I<__I2______ _____I_<*3__I______>I__I_<*3_____________ _____I_<*4__I______>I__I_<*3_____________
______I>__I2__I_<_____I__I>__I2______ ______I>_I4__I______>I__I>_I4____________ ______I>_I5__I______>I__I>_I4____________
______I_>_I2__I<______I__I_>_I2______ ______I_>I4__I______<*__I_>I4____________ ______I_>I5__I______<*__I_>I4____________
______I__>I2__I>______I__I__>I2______ ______I_<*4__I_____<_I__I_<*4____________ ______I_<*5__I_____<_I__I_<*4____________
______I__<*2__I_>_____I__I__<*2______ _______I>_I5__I___<___I__I>_I5___________ _______I>_I6__I___<___I__I>_I5___________
______I_<_I3__I__>____I__I_<_I3______ _______I_>I5__I__<____I__I_>I5___________ _______I_>I6__I__<____I__I_>I5___________
______I<__I3__I___>___I__I<__I3______ _______I_<*5__I_<_____I__I_<*5___________ _______I_<*6__I_<_____I__I_<*5___________
______I>__I3__I____>__I__I>__I3______ ________I>_I6__I>______I__I>_I6__________ ________I>_I7__I>______I__I>_I6__________
______I_>_I3__I_____>_I__I_>_I3______ ________I_>I6__I_>_____I__I_>I6__________ ________I_>I7__I_>_____I__I_>I6__________
______I__>I3__I______>I__I__>I3______ ________I_<*6__I__>____I__I_<*6__________ ________I_<*7__I__>____I__I_<*6__________
______I__<*3__I______<*__I__<*3______ _________I>_I7__I__>____I__I>_I7_________ _________I>_I8__I__>____I__I>_I7_________
______I_<_I4__I_____<_I__I_<_I4______ _________I_>I7__I___>___I__I_>I7_________ _________I_>I8__I___>___I__I_>I7_________
______I<__I4__I____<__I__I<__I4______ _________I_<*7__I____>__I__I_<*7_________ _________I_<*8__I____>__I__I_<*7_________
______I>__I4__I___<___I__I>__I4______ __________I>_I8__I____>__I__I>_I8________ __________I>_I9__I____>__I__I>_I8________
______I_>_I4__I__<____I__I_>_I4______ __________I_>I8__I_____>_I__I_>I8________ __________I_>I9__I_____>_I__I_>I8________
______I__>I4__I_<_____I__I__>I4______ __________I_<*8__I______>I__I_<*8________ __________I_<*9__I______>I__I_<*8________
______I__<*4__I<______I__I__<*4______ ___________I>_I9__I______>I__I>_I9_______ ___________I>_I0__I______>I__I>_I9_______
______I_<_I5__I>______I__I_<_I5______ ___________I_>I9__I______<*__I_>I9_______ ___________I_>I0__I______<*__I_>I9_______
______I<__I5__I_>_____I__I<__I5______ ___________I_<*9__I_____<_I__I_<*9_______ ___________I_<*0__I_____<_I__I_<*9_______
______I>__I5__I__>____I__I>__I5______ ____________I>_I0__I___<___I__I>_I0______ ____________I>_I1__I___<___I__I>_I0______
______I_>_I5__I___>___I__I_>_I5______ ____________I_>I0__I__<____I__I_>I0______ ____________I_>I1__I__<____I__I_>I0______
______I__>I5__I____>__I__I__>I5______ ____________I_<*0__I_<_____I__I_<*0______ ____________I_<*1__I_<_____I__I_<*0______
______I__<*5__I_____>_I__I__<*5______ _____________I>_I1__I>______I__I>_I1_____ _____________I>_I2__I>______I__I>_I1_____
______I_<_I6__I______>I__I_<_I6______ _____________I_>I1__I_>_____I__I_>I1_____ _____________I_>I2__I_>_____I__I_>I1_____
______I<__I6__I______<*__I<__I6______ _____________I_<*1__I__>____I__I_<*1_____ _____________I_<*2__I__>____I__I_<*1_____
______I>__I6__I_____<_I__I>__I6______ ______________I>_I2__I__>____I__I>_I2____ ______________I>_I3__I__>____I__I>_I2____
______I_>_I6__I____<__I__I_>_I6______ ______________I_>I2__I___>___I__I_>I2____ ______________I_>I3__I___>___I__I_>I2____
______I__>I6__I___<___I__I__>I6______ ______________I_<*2__I____>__I__I_<*2____ ______________I_<*3__I____>__I__I_<*2____
______I__<*6__I__<____I__I__<*6______ _______________I>_I3__I____>__I__I>_I3___ _______________I>_I4__I____>__I__I>_I3___
______I_<_I7__I_<_____I__I_<_I7______ _______________I_>I3__I_____>_I__I_>I3___ _______________I_>I4__I_____>_I__I_>I3___
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 1. Synchronization by ray exchange (a) in a system as rest with respect to a
CA; (b) ray exchange with synchronization defined by (a); (c) synchronization in
co-moving frame.
For tA = 1, tB = 4, tA′ = 5, and 4 − 1 6= 5 − 4, if the first clock is corrected
to make up for the different time of ray flights as in Fig. 1(c), tA = 2, tB = 4,
tA′ = 6, and 4−2 = 6−4. Then, this correction amounts to an asynchronicity
of the two ray clocks with respect to the “original” CA medium.
5 Now what?
Despite all these efforts, including those of the author presented above, the
computational approach to understanding universes has so far resulted in little
or no phenomenological impact; not to speak of any “killer application” which
would make the few critics and the many hesitant researchers listen to the
subject. Large segments of theoretical physics appear to be in the very same
position in other areas such as string theory or quantum gravity as well, but
this is no big comfort. In search for applications of the idea of computational
universes let us shortly discuss some of the predictions of the subject and their
possible empirical validation or falsification.
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Fig. 2. a) Greechie and b) Hasse diagram of a logic featuring complementarity
which is not a quantum logic but which is embeddable in a Boolean logic.
5.1 New range of phenomena
With regards to the logical order of propositions, there may exist phenomena
perceivable by intrinsic, embedded observers which cannot happen according
to quantum mechanics but are realizable by finite automata. The simplest
case is characterized by a Greechie hyperdiagram of triangle form, with three
atoms per edge. Its automaton partition logic is given by
{{{1}, {2}, {3, 4}}, {{1}, {2, 4}, {3}}, {{1, 4}, {2}, {3}}}. (2)
A corresponding Mealy automaton is 〈{1, 2, 3, 4}, {1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 3}, δ = 1, λ〉,
where λ(1, 1) = λ(3, 2) = λ(2, 3) = 1, λ(3, 1) = λ(2, 2) = λ(1, 3) = 2, and
λ(2, 1) = λ(4, 1) = λ(1, 2) = λ(4, 2) = λ(3, 3) = λ(4, 3) = 3.
Figure 2 depicts the Greechie and Hasse diagrams of this propositional struc-
ture.
The physical interpretation of Eq. (2) is the following: there exist six observ-
ables {1}, {2}, {3}, {1, 4}, {2, 4}, and {3, 4}; i.e., {3, 4} corresponds to “ the
system is in state 3 or in state 4.”
They are grouped into three partitions of {1, 2, 3, 4}, such that within each
group the observables are comeasurable. For instance, in the automaton ex-
ample enumerated above, the experiment with the input of symbol 2 differ-
entiates between {1, 4}, {2}, {3} and all properties obtained by forming the
logical “or” operation, such as {2, 3}. But the experiment does not reveal all
conceivable propositions, such as {1, 2}. Another experiment with the input
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of symbol 3 does, but cannot reveal other properties, such as {1, 4}. Because
of this complementarity, the propositions are nonclassical, in particular they
do not obey the distributive law: since {1, 3} ∨ {2, 3} = {1, 2, 3, 4},
{1, 2, 4} ∧ ({1, 3} ∨ {2, 3}) = {1, 2, 4} ∧ {1, 2, 3, 4}= {1, 2, 4}
= ({1, 2, 4} ∧ {1, 3}) ∨ ({1, 2, 4} ∧ {2, 3})= {1, 2}.
This humble propositional structure is thus non-classical, but quite remarkably
it also cannot be realized by quantum mechanics. The complementary groups
are interlocked in a triangle form, which is forbidden by the Hilbert space based
algebraic structure of quantum mechanics: In analogy to Kochen and Specker
[107], we denote by the symbol “⊥” the binary relation of comeasurability.
Any sequencing of observables such as
{1} ⊥ {3, 4} ⊥ {2} ⊥ {1, 4} ⊥ {3} ⊥ {2, 4} ⊥ {1}
(with {1} 6⊥ {1, 4} 6⊥ {2, 4} and so on) cannot occur in quantum mechanics.
Hence, if this propositional structure is experienced in some physical setup,
then quantum mechanics is not an appropriate theoretical representation for
it. Computational universes would be a natural candidate.
5.2 Coarse grained structure of digital space
Already Zuse mentioned that, if space is tesselated, then this tesselation will
eventually show up; either by some anisotropy or by a fundamental length
scale. No indication is given exactly when this granularity should show up;
and problems abound [108]. Yet, there is no guarantee that space and time
will be organized as a regular lattice; it may rather resemble a huge pile of
more or less randomly and densely packed sand and stabilized by whatever
forces there are.
In view of the mild discreteness of quantum mechanics already mentioned
earlier (only an integer number of quanta per field node), it might well be
that we have already unravelled the fundamental discreteness; but not in the
properties where we had expected them. So, maybe the field nodes or phase
space are more fundamental than the frames of space and time that we use to
define those fields. In this idealistic picture, space and time may be convenient
constructions of our minds to sort out the evolution of field modes.
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5.3 Exotic probabilities
One approach to the formalism is that anything which is not forbidden explic-
itly is realized 21 . As Gleason’s theorem strongly ties quantum probabilities
to Hilbert space, there may be non-classical and non-quantum probabilities
which can be modelled with automaton or generalized urn models.
Let us consider again spin state measurements on electrons modelled by two-
dimensional Hilbert space entities. The associated algebra of propositions con-
sists of (the horizontal sum of) Boolean sublattices 22 which are pasted to-
gether [109] at their extreme elements. In this case, Gleason’s theorem does
not apply. By taking the algebraic structure and the set of dispersion free
(two-valued) states alone, there exists the possibility of nongleason type prob-
ability measures. These measures have singular, separating distributions and
thus can be embedded into “classical” Boolean algebras such as generalized
urn und automaton partition logics. One particular example is represented in
Figure 3. Its probability measure is P (xi
−
) = 1 and P (xi+) = 1 − P (x
i
−
) = 0
ac a
p1
−
p1+
a ac
p2
−
p2+
L(x1) L(x2)
ac a
p3
−
p3+
ac a
pn
−
pn+
L(x3) L(xn)
· · ·
Fig. 3. Example for a nongleason type probability measure for n spin one-half state
propositional systems L(xi), i = 1, · · · , n which are not comeasurable. The super-
script i represents the ith measurement direction. The concentric circles indicate
the atoms with probability measure 1.
for i = 1, . . . , n. The associated automaton models are straightforward. Ev-
ery such dispersion free state is obtained by associating with it a particular
automaton state. Whether or not such probability distributions exist for fun-
damental processes is an open question. For spin state measurements of the
electrons, this does not seem to be the case, but again the question of state
preparation may be essential here.
Another more exotic example of a suborthoposet which is embeddable into the
three-dimensional real Hilbert lattice C(R3) and can also be realized by gener-
alized urn models and finite automata has been presented by Wright [36]. Its
Greechie diagram of the pentagonal form is drawn in Figure 4. Wright showed
that the probability measure P (ai) =
1
2
, P (bi) = 0, for i = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, as
depicted in Figure 4, is no convex combination of other pure states; and fur-
thermore, that it does not correspond to any Gleason type measure allowed as
quantum probability. In this sense, it is a “stranger-than-quantum probabil-
ity.” And although automata and generalized urn models ass well as quantum
21 Feynman’s rule of thumb states that whatever is not explicitly forbidden is manda-
tory. See also the “go-go” principle introduced in [52].
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Fig. 4. Greechie diagram of the Wright pentagon [36]. Filled squares indicate prob-
ability 12 .
system with this pentagonally interlocking algebraic structure of propositions
exist, no realizable probability measure on it is of the form of Wright’s mea-
sure defined above. The reason for this is the impossibility to represent it as
a convex combination of other dispersion free two-valued states.
5.4 “Tuning” reality
If the physical phenomena are the intrinsic view of a mathematical or compu-
tational universe, then any attempt to render, manipulate and change certain
phenomena could be interpreted as “reprogramming.” In fact, reprogramming
or “tuning” 22 reality may be a powerful new metaphor hitherto foreign to
theoretical physics. Again, one should keep in mind that this is highly specu-
lative.
5.5 Against odds
Let me again emphasise that discrete or algorithmic physics may be utterly
non mainstream and off-topic, as competing with ”traditional” continuum
physics is hard. For instance, note the fabulous coincidence between the the-
oretical and the experimental values of the anomalous magnetic moment of
the Muon aµ,t = 11659177(7)×10
−10 and aµ,e = 11659204(7)(5)×10
−10 [110].
Or take the neutron double slit experiments [111] which show a wonderful
agreement of theory and experiment.
Yet, despite all these difficulties, discrete computational physics certainly rep-
resents an interesting, speculative and challenging research area. Many ideas
22 The term “tuning” is borrowed from the movie Dark City by Alex Proyas, where
similar motives have been casted.
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from system science, interface design, to dualism (e.g., the Eccles Telegraph)
enter. The issue has metaphysical connotations. It is for instance not totally
unlikely that a demiurge would create an ”atomistic” world such as ours, in
which an immense (to us) number of discrete gaming pieces come together to
form a universe and which are constantly rearranged to form rich and varied
and seemingly complex patterns. Or there is just one consistent Universe of
Mathematics, and this is the physical Universe we are living in.
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